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MEMORY, HISTORICAL RESPONSIBILITY, TRUTH 
AND JUSTICE: THE BALKAN WARS
ANTHONY OBERSCHALL1
ABSTRACT In 1998, during a fieldtrip in the former Yugoslavia, I interviewed members 
of associations of internally displaced persons (IDPs). They were petitioning the 
authorities to recover their homes and properties because they wanted to “go home”. 
They also wanted the truth told about their families, communities and the war. 
They presented me with photos of houses or farms, anonymous letters threatening 
them if they would not leave, photos of missing family members and legal papers. 
And they wanted justice. They wanted that those responsible for killing their kin 
and neighbors and driving them from their homes should be punished. Based on 
these and other experiences I investigate four institutions designed to learn the truth 
about contested historical events and their interpretation: the international criminal 
tribunal, the truth and reconciliation commission, the outsider commission, and 
political agreement between adversaries.
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Ethnic conflict is caused by fear of the future, lived though the past.
Vesna Pesic
Mistaken ideas always end in bloodshed…but in every case it is 
someone else’s blood.
That is why some of our thinkers feel free to say just about anything.
Albert Camus
A former political prisoner who returned to Prizren after the Kosovo war 
told Mark Baskin (U.S. political scientist):  On my way to work each day I 
greet the judge who sentenced me to nine years in prison.
1  Anthony Oberschall is emeritus professor of sociology at the University of North Carolina; 
e-mail: tonob@email.unc.edu.
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THE SEARCH FOR MEMORY, TRUTH AND JUSTICE AT 
THE GRASSROOTS
In Ljusci Palanka, in Bosnia, the Association for Return to Prijedor had 
compiled a book listing 3146 Muslim persons (nine to a page, about half with 
a photo) missing from the district, including 120 children and 400 women. 
They were working on volume 2. Most were dead and missing as a result 
of the ethnic cleansing of Prijedor district in the spring of 1992. I asked the 
leader of the group who was responsible. He said that “not all Serbs were 
complicit in the ethnic cleansing. Many were, but some helped the Muslims, 
some were killed by other Serbs, and some were so scared when ordered to 
kill that they wept, but then they killed”. He rejected collective responsibility 
for Serbs. His views were nuanced and complex, as historical truth is often.
In Bihac, there was a photo exhibition of 50 Catholic churches destroyed 
or damaged by the Serbs in the war. One photo of the church before, and one 
photo after destruction: memory preserved in photographs.
Elsewhere, people wanted memories erased and a new history written. In 
Banja Luka (the capital of Republika Srpska) in May 1993, fifteen mosques 
were dynamited and razed during the ethnic cleansing of non-Serbs – including 
the historic Ferhadija mosque, an architectural treasure. Overnight, the ruins 
and remains were buried in dumps, the site was bulldozed and left vacant as 
though it had never existed. It was not marked on any city map. There was 
no picture postcard of it anywhere to be found. In a nearby park, the busts 
of World War II partisan heroes were toppled or broken, lying in the grass. I 
asked my friendly hotel clerk to explain. He said they commemorated heroes 
in Tito’s Yugoslavia and people now want to forget they’d ever been part of it. 
After pressure from the international administration, the city issued a building 
permit to a Muslim foundation to rebuild the Ferhadija mosque. In May 2001, 
the ceremony for the laying of the cornerstone was disrupted by a hostile mob 
of about a thousand who attacked the two hundred and fifty officials as police 
stood by watching. Ambassadors and local Muslims sought refuge in a nearby 
Islamic center. Since then, it has been rebuilt.
These vignettes tell the grassroots story of memory, truth and justice. The 
victims seek to preserve the memory of their dead and missing and where 
and how they lived; they want their former property back, hope to return 
and insist on accountability and justice – the perpetrators meanwhile deny 
responsibility, want to erase memory and construct a fabricated history, and 
do not want victims to return. Local justice is problematic: some of the police, 
prosecutors and judges were the organizers of massacres and ethnic cleansing 
activities, together with party leaders and the military. They appropriated the 
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houses, autos, businesses, positions and savings of the victims, and robbed 
them of their foreign currencies. 
The demand for justice and truth from one side in a violent conflict and the 
determination to deny this from the other side and insist on another competing 
truth, raises the question of how truth is established in contentious human 
affairs and what versions of history become accepted.
INSTITUTIONS FOR TRUTH AND JUSTICE
Two methods of inquiry for knowledge and truth have been forged over the 
centuries: these are scientific inquiry and judicial institutions for determining 
the guilt or innocence of those accused of crime. The scientific method guides 
inquiry for knowledge about nature. It follows a set of rules and principles 
developed and tested over centuries, and keeps being adapted to new fields 
within science. Skepticism of inherited authority and acceptance of the 
findings of observations and experiments are at its core. Science defines 
its domains as natural phenomena and distinguishes them from spiritual, 
supernatural, and religious beliefs that are matters of faith not investigated 
with the scientific method. The scientific method is objective and impersonal. 
It holds that nature is impersonal and its laws independent of human interests, 
passions and wishes. Scientists study nature as it is and not as religious and 
political authorities believe it to be. Nature is invariant and lawful. Clarity 
and simplicity in theorizing are valued over ambiguity, elaboration and 
complexity. Science is public, cooperative and international: its publications, 
findings, instruments and techniques are a collective good for all mankind 
to share. There should be no private ownership and secrecy in knowledge. 
Scientists build on knowledge accumulated by previous generations of 
scientists. Theories and findings are provisional, not final. Dissent and debate 
ensure progress. Desire for recognition and fame, financial interest, national 
prestige, rivalry and competition may motivate the scientist at the stage of 
discovery but are eliminated from the logic of proof. Peer reviews of scientific 
work and replication of findings by other teams of scientists ensure that the 
discoverers are not the final arbiters of claims to knowledge. The scientific 
method has been spectacularly successful.
The adversarial method in the criminal justice system for determining guilt 
or innocence of those accused of crime dates to the Middle Ages when it 
displaced justice by oathing, private revenge and retribution by kinfolk. The 
adversarial method rests on the conviction that for getting at truth in human 
affairs, the strongest case for both sides should be made by advocates to a third, 
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non-interested party that decides the truth beyond reasonable doubt. There is 
a presumption of innocence until guilt is proven. Advocates for both sides 
have access to the same and all pertinent facts, are bound by the same rules 
for presenting their cases, and the same rules on evidence and trial procedure 
are enforced by an impartial judge. Truth emerges through vigorous probing 
and cross-examination of the material facts and human testimony, with false, 
unreliable, contradictory and ambiguous evidence discarded, conjectures 
based on such material made implausible and the remaining robust evidence 
allowing a judgment to be made about truth by the jury or a panel of judges. 
Trial errors are appealed through a higher court. The interest of the prosecution 
to convict, and the tools it has for swaying the jury with selective and biased 
arguments are balanced by the interests of the defense for an acquittal and the 
tools it has to counter omissions and weaknesses in the prosecution’s case. 
This is the ideal. Like all institutions, justice is vulnerable to human error. 
Miscarriages of justice do occur, yet some are later corrected, and steps keep 
being taken within the legal profession, such as the use of DNA evidence, to 
improve criminal investigations and trials.
In politics and public affairs, the means for getting at knowledge and 
truth are deeply flawed. Political debate seeks persuasion and consensus 
rather than truth. The venue of public debate is mass media and political 
sites accessed through the media and the internet. Responsible research and 
reporting is overshadowed by superficial and sensational coverage of public 
issues that blur the line between fact, opinion, information, and entertainment. 
Misinformation, falsehood, a biased selection of facts, and fabrication are 
fair game and impair knowledge and truth seeking. “Balance” in the media 
confronts one story with another story, reminiscent of two siblings each telling 
a parent “I did not do it; she did it.” Martin Kaplan refers to such so-called 
balance as “polarized pairs doing battle without a resolution” (Kaplan 2007). 
The jury in the “court of public opinion” are ordinary people who selectively 
expose themselves to views with which they already agree. Advocates for 
policy based on faulty knowledge do not pay the price for faulty judgment. 
When failure can not be covered up, denial of responsibility and blaming 
others is the standard response. 
How are judgments about knowledge and truth made? Much of what we know 
and believe mirrors conventional wisdom, peer opinion, and other milieus 
where agreement and consensus are valued and are tickets to admission and 
good standing in a group. Truth derived from personal experience is a small 
part of what we know. We can “reality” test the hardness of stone, but not 
unemployment rate or health policies. Charles Lindblom writes that “I take 
it as undeniable that what people think about the social world…derives from 
Anthony Oberschall.indd   34 2010.06.29.   9:57:58
35MEMORY, HISTORICAL RESPONSIBILITY, TRUTH AND JUSTICE 
CORVINUS JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY AND SOCIAL POLICY  1 (2010) 
social interchange far more than from direct observation…for answers…you 
depend almost entirely on other people, including acquaintances, journalists, 
other people who reach you through press and broadcasting” (Lindblom 1990: 
78).   Belief gains truth value from confirmation in membership and reference 
groups. Belief gains truth value when it is the majority belief – vox populi, 
vox dei. Beliefs become convictions when trusted authorities voice them: 
ancestors, Founding Fathers, God(s), sacred texts, experts of many stripes 
and colors. Social knowledge is socially constructed and socially tested. The 
opportunity cost of checking the truth of all but a few of our beliefs other than 
by social testing, assuming we have the intellectual skills and resources to do 
it, is prohibitive. There is no escaping trusting other persons and institutions 
for getting to about knowledge and truth. 
Public communications consist of a messenger using a message to persuade 
the public. The messenger is an interested advocate and uses well-known 
and proven means of persuasion – called the ‘art of propaganda’ –, appeal 
to passions (fear is especially powerful (Hovland et al. 1963), repetition, 
omission, stereotyping, exaggeration, misinformation, and so on. 
The message is framed using metaphors, catchphrases and symbols. A 
frame is a mental structure which situates and connects events and people 
into a meaningful narrative. A study of mass media framing of nuclear power 
in the U.S. from 1945 to 1980 based on content analysis found that a small 
number of symbols and themes and icons framed public discourse on the 
polarity of “technological and scientific progress” accenting the benefits of 
nuclear power versus a “devil’s bargain” highlighting the dangers of out-of-
control technology, with lesser used frames playing in a minor key (Gamson 
1988). Uncertain, unfamiliar, complex, unobserved events and social units 
are framed by means of metaphor and analogy with the structure and moral 
values of what is certain, familiar, simple, and observed. Knowledge and truth 
are thus socially created through persuasive frames. 
Social psychological and mass communications research has found that the 
recipients of communications – the public – selectively expose themselves 
to information they are likely to agree with, which is the dominant view in 
their social milieu, and selectively avoid information that they are likely to 
disagree with, which is also what is unpopular in their social milieu. Thus 
the recipient actively reinforces consensus. Beliefs persist because one keeps 
confirming them selectively and because one filters out contrary information. 
Other research (Muntz 2006) found that people tend to talk politics within 
homogeneous clusters. When people of opposite political views talk to 
one another they tend to avoid politics because they do not want to put at 
risk through disagreement a social relationship they value. A related social 
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psychological process (“cognitive dissonance”) modifies or changes contrary 
or “dissonant” information to make it fit into an existing set of beliefs and 
frame. Denial can be thus explained. When you greatly value your nationality, 
highly-valued information about it is easy to fit into one’s nationality frame, 
but this is not the case for damaging information, such as information 
about war crimes. The psychological dissonance between positive value for 
nationality and negative value for war crimes can be resolved in two ways. 
Many people simply deny or justify the war crimes (“it did not happen”, “they 
did it to us also” or “they did it first”), and a few develop a more complex 
view of theirs and others’ nationalities. Similar to denial, folk thinking about 
truth is deficient because it dismisses negative evidence as “exceptions”, thus 
false beliefs persist despite the accumulation of evidence to the contrary.  
Social testing works much of the time for the routines of life. When I was 
six years old, I was convinced that the earth was round and not flat. How could 
that be? In my room, I could spin a round globe with all the oceans, continents 
and countries displayed in vivid colors. My parents and first grade teacher 
told me the earth was round. I had travel books with drawings of strange 
animals like camels and polar bears and mountains and palaces, and their 
locations could be matched to the globe. Why would my parents, teachers and 
the writers of these books want to deceive me? The thought didn’t even occur 
to my class mates and me. What they taught us was true, but had they taught 
us the earth was flat, like the pages in an atlas, we would have believed this as 
well. Nor would either belief have any consequences on our daily life, except 
in so far as disagreeing with our parents and peers would have meant being 
labeled weird or stubborn or stupid. 
Social testing does not eliminate passion, interest, biased selection and 
omission of evidence, fabrication, and other cognitive and emotional 
flaws from judgment. It seeks confirmation for preconceptions and rejects 
organized skepticism. Social testing is the opposite of scientific inquiry and 
the adversarial process in justice for getting at knowledge and truth. It forges 
consensus within a group around a local truth. Another group coalesces around 
a different consensus and local truth. When these two confront one another in 
a public forum, one truth confronts the other truth, and there is no mechanism 
for resolving the dispute as in scientific inquiry and the adversarial method 
of justice. 
The pursuit of memory, truth and responsibility takes place under flawed 
human conditions. When parallel and contradictory “truths” coexist, they 
can be manipulated by political entrepreneurs for a future round of violent 
conflicts, as happened with the memory of World War II atrocities and ethnic 
cleansing in Yugoslavia which was not cleared up by the Tito regime. How can 
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scientific inquiry and the adversarial mode of justice – that have demonstrated 
their worth in the pursuit of knowledge and truth – be incorporated into the 
“court of public opinion” for historical, political and policy debate? I will 
examine four institutions for historical truth that have attempted just this, and 
evaluate the results achieved: the international tribunal, as the United Nations 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY); the Truth 
Commission, as in the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission; 
other commissions, such as the Goldstone commission on the Gaza war; and 
cooperation between adversaries using political and academic institutions for 
changing biased national histories in school texts and curricula into a more 
truthful history, as France and Germany did after world War II. 
Is it at all possible to establish factual truths for contested historical and 
current events, including assigning responsibility for actions and crimes in an 
adversarial judicial institution? 
TRUTH ABOUT FACTS AND EVENTS: 
IRVING VS. LIPSTADT
The standard for establishing historical truth in a trial was set by the British 
judge Charles Gray in his judgment on April 11, 2000 at the conclusion of 
Irving versus Lipstadt, the holocaust denial trial2. The trial turned on how 
historians used historical evidence. The plaintiff Irving argued that the facts 
about any complex human enterprise contain inconsistencies, gaps, and 
uncertainties and that, therefore, different interpretations of the same events 
are normal and legitimate. The defense established that Irving had practiced 
deliberate manipulation of data and deception, such as omission of contrary 
evidence, fabricating and altering quotes, and doctoring the historical record. 
These were not random errors and sloppy scholarship, but methods used 
consistently to stack the evidence in favor of Irving’s point of view. 
In Gray’s judgment, the defense had proved beyond a reasonable doubt 
that Irving had created a body of data that was not truthful. Though not a 
historian with a university appointment, Irving had a good reputation as a 
military historian in some circles. Over the years he had written several books 
on the German military history of World War II and had located important 
materials in archives and interviewed German participants in key events. To 
prove that Irving had fabricated history in a trial was a tedious and expensive 
undertaking. The defense hired Richard Evans, a well-known historian of 
2  www.holocaustdenial.net/trial/judgement/13.15
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modern Germany, and he in turn put many graduate students to work checking 
hundreds of quotes and citations Irving had made in his writings to thousands 
of sources and documents located in dozens of archives. Irving vigorously 
cross-examined Evans and other researchers during his defense, trying to cast 
doubt on their methods and findings. 
The judge concluded that in seventeen instances that were at the core of 
the trial, Lipstadt’s contention that Irving had not done objective historical 
scholarship was true. In one instance, Irving had repeatedly written and 
said in lectures and media appearances that between one to two hundred 
thousand people died in the February 13 and 14, 1945 British bombing raids 
on Dresden. The defense demonstrated that Irving had based his numbers on 
document TB 47, which the Dresden archivist had told him was a forgery, 
and that Irving knew about other documents from the Dresden police and 
the office responsible for disposing of the bodies which listed deaths in 
the 20,000 to 30,000 range (which Irving contended were incomplete and 
unreliable without offering credible reasons for his opinions). Moreover, the 
defense produced the authentic TB 47 report, which supported other military 
historians’ estimates of twenty-five to thirty thousand deaths. Judge Gray 
concluded that the fabrication and intentional omissions of evidence, bias, 
and advocacy – claiming to be scholarship – can be distinguished from sound 
scholarship and rational argument, using the same methods of proof as in a 
criminal trial for establishing the guilt or innocence of the defendant. 
THE ICTY
Could the truth be established for on-going or recent history through a trial? 
International stakeholders assuming responsibility for peace and stability in 
the Balkans created the United Nations International Criminal Tribunal for 
the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in 1993 and exerted diplomatic and economic 
pressure on the governments of the adversarial parties to cooperate with 
war crimes investigations. Public opinion in these countries condemned the 
Tribunal’s work as victor’s justice and as collective punishment, a belief 
promoted and exploited by nationalist politicians and the trial defendants. 
Others argued that ascertaining truth and justice is not possible in an on-going 
violent conflict. The ICTY is very expensive and time consuming. It costs 
about one hundred million dollars a year. Of the estimated fifty thousand 
persons who were responsible for atrocities, war crimes and crimes against 
humanity, the ICTY will try about two hundred by 2012, mostly senior military 
and political offenders. For lower officials and ordinary citizens, state courts 
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have been set up in Serbia, Croatia, and Bosnia, and with assistance from the 
ICTY, have started prosecuting war-related crimes. The ICTY went ahead 
with prosecutions despite these criticisms and obstacles. 
ICTY versus General Stanislav Galic.  The UN Security Council mandate 
to the ICTY is “accountability and justice during extraordinary periods of 
lawlessness when national justice fails to do so”. The prosecutions were meant 
to cut through the fog of propaganda, misinformation and lies and create a 
public record of what crimes had actually occurred and which individuals were 
responsible for criminal acts: i.e. truth and justice. It wasn’t an easy task. The 
ICTY might indict an alleged war criminal, but had no power to arrest them, or 
to subpoena witnesses and documents. It had to get the cooperation of reluctant 
governments, especially Serbia, Croatia, and Republika Srpska, where public 
opinion regarded the indicted as national heroes. It had few resources to protect 
witnesses, and some were threatened and withdrew or altered their depositions. 
On the defense side, false witnesses came forward and documents were forged 
that claimed alibis for defendants, putting them far from the scene of massacres 
and other crimes. More important still, comrades who knew about the crimes 
did not testify against one another, and ministries refused to make available 
incriminating documents (e.g. the minutes of high-level meetings where crucial 
decisions were made about military operations and ethnic cleansing). Even 
electronic intercepts of military communications by UN forces and international 
observer teams were of limited value because they were coded.
Here is where science comes to the rescue in war crimes trials. There may 
not be a witness to a massacre, nor documentary evidence, but years later 
when mass graves are discovered and the bones exhumed, forensic specialists 
by painstaking methods establish the number, gender, and approximate age of 
the victims, the approximate date of the massacre, and from marks on bones 
and other objects like bullets and bits of clothing and buttons, they provide 
information about how the victims were killed (e.g. shot from behind) and 
what weapons were used. This information can be matched with the last 
sightings of detainees on buses and trucks who have since gone missing, 
and with the police or military units that rounded up the detainees. Ballistics 
experts can determine from the pattern of casualties and physical damage 
caused by explosions (e.g. mortar shells) which direction the shell was fired 
from and the approximate distance to the target, and this can be checked 
against information about military units at that location at that date recorded 
by UN or NATO peace troops. Similarly, the coroners who examine bodies 
for cause of death can determine which wounds are entrance and exit wounds, 
and which direction the bullet was fired from in relation to where the deceased 
was hit, and whether the bullet was of a certain caliber that is used for sniper 
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fire at long distance or an ordinary rifle used at shorter range. These methods 
and findings can and are challenged by defense experts, but the upshot is that 
scientific evidence in part substitutes for the documents and witnesses that 
are not forthcoming.
How were incriminating facts established in the trial of General Stanislas 
Galic3 at the Hague before the ICTY? Galic was the commanding officer of 
the Bosnian Serb forces from September 1992 to August 1994, during the 
siege of Sarajevo. The prosecutor charged that Galic was responsible for a 
campaign of sniping and shelling civilians in Sarajevo which resulted in many 
deaths and injuries to civilians. The defense argued that the casualties were 
collateral to legitimate military activity, and resulted from targeting errors 
and stray bullets. The trial hinged on evidence about the number of civilian 
casualties and on whether they were caused by deliberate or indiscriminate 
shelling and sniping. The trial started on December 29, 1999 and ended on 
November 30, 2006 with the judges’ verdict at a final appeal. A total of 171 
witnesses were heard; fifteen reports by experts were submitted; there were 
1,268 exhibits consisting of documents, reports, film, photographs, maps, and 
sound-recordings. It was a long, expensive and hotly-contested trial. My focus 
is on the number of civilian deaths from the fighting – a matter of fact – and 
the criminality of those deaths, i.e. intentional killing or collateral damage. 
The prosecution’s principal expert witness on civilian deaths was the 
demographer Eva Tabeau who headed the demography unit at the ICTY. The 
first task was to establish from military maps exactly which areas of Sarajevo 
were held by the Bosniak forces, and then to get an accurate count of deaths for 
the population of that area for the time period of the indictment. The number 
of deaths was discerned from death certificates at hospitals and matched with 
the records of funeral homes and triangulated with a 1994 household census 
listing dead, wounded and missing. Natural, accidental and criminal deaths 
were sorted out, and then military deaths. Military deaths were categorized by 
whether the deceased wore uniform or insignia, carried a weapon, and/or was 
listed as a death in official records – e.g. for the purpose of payment of death 
benefits to a family – and some other criteria such as location on the front line. 
The rest of the deaths were civilians killed in the fighting: of 3798 total deaths 
there remained 1399 civilians, of whom 617 were women, 295 children (0-17 
years old), and 85 elderly persons.
The defense contested both the totals and many particular deaths. For 
instance it pointed to incomplete information and inconsistencies in autopsy 
reports, questioned the qualifications of some who performed autopsies and 
3 Case IT-98-29-1.
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the technical facilities for post-mortems (interruptions in electricity supply, 
etc.), and argued in particular cases that the individual killed was military 
rather than civilian, or was collateral damage, i.e. a military target within a 
dense civilian population. These claims were disputed by the prosecution, 
using evidence. For instance, in the case of three girls killed by sniper fire 
while they were pulling a wheelbarrow loaded with cans of water, the defense 
claimed that there were Bosniak soldiers in the vicinity. The prosecution 
countered with testimony that there was no military activity near them, and 
similarly for other civilian deaths. The trial demonstrated that it is possible 
to establish quite accurately casualty figures that are hotly contested in an 
adversarial procedure by experts and witnesses. 
In the Galic trial, the criminality of the civilian deaths in Sarajevo was 
also hotly contested. The defense claimed that the Bosniak forces fired on 
their own civilians to create an international incident. Ballistics and medical 
experts were called to establish the direction of fire, the caliber of the bullets, 
and entrance and exit wounds to contest such an interpretation of the deaths. 
A second line of defense was collateral damage. The civilian deaths occurred 
because the military targets were in close proximity to and mixed in with 
civilians. The prosecution provided evidence that in many instances that this 
was not the case. The prosecution further contended that when UNPROFOR 
warned General Galic about sniper and mortar fire at civilians, sniper fire and 
deaths ceased immediately and completely for a time, which indicated that he 
had command control over his soldiers, and that the sniping was not simply 
reckless firing by rogues. It argued from such evidence that there existed a 
campaign of attacks against civilians by the Bosnian Serb forces under General 
Galic. The defense countered that the number of deaths per month had actually 
decreased during Galic’s command, but the defense showed that the decrease 
was due to civilians learning how to avoid being targets, the building of anti-
sniping barricades, safer pedestrian routes, closing and moving schools, and 
shifting humanitarian aid distribution points out of sniper sight. 
The judgment concluded that “the Majority (of judges) is thus convinced that 
civilians in Sarajevo were attacked directly or without distinction from SRK 
(Bosnian Serb Army) controlled territory…the exact number of civilian casualties 
from these attacks is not known. What is known is that hundreds of civilians 
were killed and thousands were injured in sniping and shelling incidents…the 
attacks were not isolated incidents but amounted to a widespread and systematic 
campaign…it is established that General Galic, as commander of the SRK, had 
effective control of SRK troops…that he was informed of the attacks against 
civilians committed by the SRK forces…the Accused was well aware of the 
unlawful activities of his troops”. The defense tried to explain the civilian deaths 
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due to the “fog of war” and “collateral damage” frame. Based on the evidence, 
the judges accepted the prosecution’s “intentionality” interpretation of the civilian 
deaths, ruled out the “fog of war” and “collateral damage” frame of the defense, 
and held Galic personally responsible for war crimes. 
The Galic trial demonstrates that it is possible, in an adversarial process, 
to discriminate between appropriate and inappropriate interpretations of the 
facts, or plausible and implausible “frames” for interpretation. This was also 
demonstrated in Irving versus Lipstadt: not only did Irving fabricate and 
alter factual evidence, but the pattern of omissions when there was contrary 
evidence and the choices he made when there was conflicting evidence were 
systematically biased rather than random. Irving consistently favored a benign 
interpretation of Hitler, Nazi and Wehrmacht intentions and actions, and 
consistently minimized and rationalized incriminating material, i.e. he used 
a pro-Nazi frame rather than the skepticism frame of professional historians 
(Evans 2000).
The Galic and a hundred other trials produced a wealth of information about 
specific events, crimes and responsibility for them. I call these ‘micro-level 
historical truths’. To make broader sense of what at times are discrete facts 
in a convoluted organizational and political context the ICTY asks “expert 
witnesses” to submit reports to the court. The experts are cross-examined by 
the defense, as all witnesses are. I followed the Seselj trial closely, having 
myself been an expert witness, and submitted a report titled “Vojislav Seselj’s 
nationalist propaganda: contents, techniques, aims and impacts, 1990-1994”, 
and having been cross-examined by Seselj himself for several hours. Yves 
Tomic, a French historian and political scientists, was the expert witness on 
Yugoslav politics and elections in the post-Tito era. Although much of what 
he reported was known from scholarly research and journalistic reporting, 
he also testified about little known events, such as the huge mass meetings 
of Croatian and BiH Serbs in Krajina in July 1989 (before the 1990 Croatian 
elections) to commemorate the historic battle of Kosovo, during which 
speeches were made for Greater Serbia and for secession of Krajina from 
Croatia. His testimony held up under cross-examination and is significant 
for the timing of the secession movement and Croatian nationalist reactions. 
Tomic’s main contribution to the court and not just to the Seselj trial itself was 
to summarize and give a reasoned interpretation to a mass of contradictory 
and contested information on what led to the outbreak of the Croatia-Serbia 
war. Other expert witnesses on the causes of the breakup of Yugoslavia, such 
as James Gow and Robert Hayden who had somewhat differing views and 
interpretations, were vigorously cross-examined in the Tadic trial. This will 
surely benefit the writing of a truthful history.
Anthony Oberschall.indd   42 2010.06.29.   9:57:59
43MEMORY, HISTORICAL RESPONSIBILITY, TRUTH AND JUSTICE 
CORVINUS JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY AND SOCIAL POLICY  1 (2010) 
Raymond Theunens, a Belgian intelligence officer assigned to UNPROFOR 
and SFOR, was the expert witness on the military, security, and paramilitary 
organizations and operations in the Balkan wars. His testimony clarified a 
number of important matters on command and control in these linked-up 
structures, and on how to untangle the secrecy and purposeful ambiguity 
about obscuring responsibility for war crimes and crimes against humanity. 
For instance, his testimony established that the SRS volunteer (Chetniks) war 
staff had command and control in Slavonija and Baranja in the summer of 
1991, and that the JNA opposed it – and that JNA military reports documented 
looting and abuse of civilians and other crimes by volunteers, and the fact that 
volunteers were integrated into the JNA only in December. Seselj admitted 
that he recruited, organized, and deployed SRS volunteers, but denied that he 
and the SRS political leaders had “military command” over their operations. 
He claimed that military command was transferred to JNA and Territorial 
Defense Forces (TDF) as soon as the volunteers entered fighting zones. The 
prosecution confronted Seselj with a video clip from Croatian TV where he 
was asked (in the summer of 1991) “are you commander of the forces here (in 
Croatia)?” to which Seselj answered, “yes, I have control, so far I have always 
exercised control...” To the ICTY court, Seselj explained “I really did say that 
I was commander and that I had control. I had general control over discipline 
and conduct; the TDF had control in the operational sense”. Theunens also 
described how military intelligence would routinely write reports saying that 
soldiers drew fire from buildings where civilians lodged, whether or not it was 
true, to justify attacks by combatants on civilian targets, and then pre-date the 
reports. For anyone perusing military archives with a view to interpreting the 
fighting, this is valuable information.
Expert testimony and reports are an important matter for Seselj’s trial 
because he is not charged with actually killing civilians himself, but with 
commanding and controlling the Chetniks who did commit crimes. Beyond 
that, a historian or anyone who seeks to understand Balkan warfare and 
ethnic cleansing may gain a lot of help from Theunens’ report and testimony, 
and that from other experts. From the micro-events reported by witnesses 
and documents, which were cross-examined and tested, and expert witness 
background and analyses, which were also cross-examined, plus other 
documents and evidence, historical memory converges around many agreed-
on facts and a far narrower range of reasonable interpretations than when 
propaganda and social testing prevail.
Other Balkan truths.  In addition to the adversarial method, sound social 
science research also gets at the truth about controversial matters of fact that 
were exploited by political leaders. Two instances from many that I have 
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examined concern the numbers of victims reported in propaganda campaigns. 
Serb nationalists accused Croats of killing seven hundred thousand Serbs in the 
Jasenovac World War II concentration camp. On the 60th anniversary of the 
death camp’s liberation on April 21, 2005, the leaders of the Jasenovac camp 
victims association, a multi-national group who for many years compiled the 
names of victims, reported that the Jasenovac museum had a list of 59,188 
dead, and that although the real number may never be known precisely, the 
association estimates that between eighty and one hundred thousand died 
there (about half Serbs, the others Roma, Jews, Croats and others).4 
Charges of sexual assault and rape made by Albanians in Kosovo against 
Serbs were highlighted in Serb mass media, and were part of Milosevic’s 
justification for “taking back Kosovo” in 1989-90. Vojislav Stojanovic, 
president of the Association of University Teachers and Scholars, stated 
that “…the savage Albanian terrorists are now running amok in Kosovo and 
Metohiya, attacking and destroying everything that is Serbian…Kosovo and 
Metohiya are gripped by fear of terrorists armed to the teeth…” A team of 
Belgrade social scientists analyzed Kosovo crime statistics in the 1980’s 
from Kosovo court records and found that the rate of sexual assault and 
attempted assault from 1979 to 1989 in Kosovo (0.96% per 10,000 adult 
males) was lower than in central Serbia (2.43) and in all Yugoslavia (1.63); 
that the conviction rate for those accused was higher in Kosovo (52%) than 
in Serbia (31%) and all Yugoslavia (42%), and that rapes in Kosovo tended to 
occur within national group, and not across. Serb victim/Serb aggressor and 
Albanian victim/Albanian aggressor crimes accounted for 81% of reported 
sexual assaults (Popovic et al. 1990). This research and these figures were 
ignored. Mira Markovic, a professor of sociology and wife of Milosevic, 
called the victimization of Serbs in Kosovo “feudal terror.” 
In these instances, data compiled through the practice of sound social 
science are more accurate than the numbers and opinions promoted by 
ideologists. More accurate figures were ignored for political reasons, but 
can and should be used when a truthful history of these Balkan conflicts is 
written. Facts can be distinguished from opinions and wishful thinking. Not 
all estimates are equivalent; some are closer to the truth than others, and there 
are methods based on scientific inquiry and the adversarial method for getting 
closer to the truth. Interpretive frames that are appropriate and reasonable can 
be distinguished from others that are not.
4  Hina News Service “60th anniversary…” April 21, 2005.
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DENIAL AND COLLECTIVE MYTHS
Elena Bonner wrote that a collective myth is the “collective memory of a 
people about their past which sustains …their views of the world they live 
in”5. A self-image for ethnic groups and nations is positive. Its members obtain 
dignity and other social and psychological rewards from it, and seek public 
approval for it. This phenomenon is called ‘ethnocentrism’ and is as universal 
as language and the existence of families in human communities. The visible 
markers of positive self-image are monuments, flags, street names, national 
holidays, festivals, museums, songs, literature and poetry, and history in 
schools. These public signals affirm on a daily basis the collective myths of 
the nation. The theory of “cognitive dissonance” explains how information 
contrary to conventional wisdom and collective myths is modified or changed 
to fit into existing beliefs and frames. Atrocities and war crimes reflect poorly 
on positive self-image and do not fit with public conceptions of national myths. 
They are experienced as an attack on the moral worth of the entire group, and 
the psychological response is to downplay them, justify them and even deny 
them altogether. Denial is made easier when trusted authorities deny and the 
mass media adopt a denial frame. The denial syndrome is widespread and not 
just in use in the Balkans.
What if the evidence for crimes is overwhelming and not just transmitted 
through the media but accessed from personal experience and interpersonal 
sources? The events of Prijedor in Bosnia during the May to August 1992 
ethnic cleansing, massacres, and concentration camp atrocities are a case in 
point. In the 1991 census, Prijedor district was 44% Muslim and 42.5% Serb; 
ethnic cleansing and killings reduced the Muslim population from forty-nine 
thousand to six thousand and Croats from six thousand to three thousand. The 
organizers of the Serb coup d’état, ethnic cleansing and camps were members 
of a Serb Crisis Committee headed by well-known Prijedor Serbs such as the 
police chief, former and current mayor and deputy mayor, head of the local 
Red Cross, director of the hospital, all well known local figures. Those who 
rounded up the victims, guarded them in the camps and tortured, raped and 
killed them were for the most part local Serb police and volunteers, some 
of whom knew their victims well, augmented by non-local paramilitaries. 
By accident, the international media stumbled on the camps and the camp 
survivors were evacuated by the Red Cross, which meant that many victims 
and eyewitnesses told their stories then, and later also in the ICTY trials. 
5 New York Review of Books, March 8, 2001.
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The evidence of crimes is overwhelming. It was covered thoroughly in the 
international media and books written by journalists, special reports by Human 
Rights Watch, a major UN Report (the Bassiouni Report), and the ICTY trials 
of several of the Crisis Committee members as well as camp officials, shift 
leaders, and guards. Hanna Sophie Greve, a historian, investigator and expert 
witness on Prijedor at the Tadic trial (It-94-1), provided comprehensive 
background and an analysis of what happened. The leaders themselves gave 
some incriminating interviews when they were firmly in power: e.g. the head 
of police described the entire ethnic cleansing operation to a local newspaper 
one year after it happened, and told the journalist Tim Judah “the assets of 
fifty thousand Muslims and Croats expelled from the region amounted to 
several million DM…the greater part of these resources have either been 
transferred to Serbia (by the paramilitaries) or have been expropriated by 
private individuals (Serbs in Prijedor)” (Judah 1997: 254). The perpetrators 
remained in power throughout the war and after the Dayton peace settlement 
for several more years before they were indicted by the ICTY. During this 
period they perpetrated more crimes such as dynamiting the houses of Muslim 
and Croat internally displaced persons (IDP) who tried to return. By means 
of their control of local organizations, such as banks, the Red Cross, the 
distribution of humanitarian aid, transportation and the police, they operated 
a criminal mafia of corruption and war profiteering. 
The ICTY trials were thorough. The trial of Milomir Stakic, physician and 
director of the community health center, member of the Crisis Committee and 
mayor in 1997, lasted one year from 4/02 to 5/03. The prosecution presented 
37 witnesses and 19 witness statements in 80 sitting days, and the defense 
38 witnesses and 7 witness statements over 67 sitting days. 1448 exhibits 
were admitted in evidence. Stakic was charged with specific counts of 
crimes against humanity, murder, extermination, deportation, inhumane acts, 
persecutions, and two counts of genocide. His defense claimed that the camps 
were only transit centers for the protection and assistance of people who 
wanted to leave. Attempts to intimidate witnesses were numerous. Thirty-four 
witnesses were granted protective measures, e.g. facial and voice distortion, 
pseudonyms, testifying in closed session and redaction of testimony. Stakic 
was sentenced to 20 years to life in July 2003. In other prosecutions as well, 
there were attempts to intimidate witnesses, and defense witnesses gave alibis 
for the accused, placing them far from the alleged scene of particular crimes, 
but the evidence was overwhelming against the perpetrators. 
Relations between Serbs and others in Prijedor were characterized as good 
before the conflict erupted in the open. Biljana Plavsic, the Prime Minister 
of Republika Srpska, testified at her ICTY on December 12, 2002, that “the 
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reason (for the ethnic cleansing and other crimes) lies in the word fear, fear 
that renders people blind. Driven by the obsession never to be reduced to 
the status of victim again, we allowed ourselves to become the makers of 
victims”. We know that in March 1992 the TV relay transmitter on Mt. Kozara 
was seized by nationalists, and Zagreb and Sarajevo TV stations were cut 
off. The remaining Serb media flooded the airwaves with footage of World 
War II Ustasha and Muslim atrocities against Serbs, and accused Muslims of 
plotting to create an Islamic state in Bosnia. These accusations and falsehoods 
sowed the seeds of mistrust and fear between Serbs and others who were their 
neighbors, pupils, and work mates. No one was prepared, however, for the 
later brutality. For example, Dusko Tadic, a low-level camp guard, tortured 
his friend – the Muslim policeman Emir Karabasic – who had been a patron in 
his café, whom he had taught karate, and with whom he had frequently jogged 
(IT-94-1, transcript).
After the Serb Prijedor leadership was arrested and indicted by the ICTY, the 
return of Muslim and Croat refugees and IDPs became safe and several thousand 
did so (Wesselingh – Vaulerin 2005).  Because a critical mass returned, they 
managed to elect several of their leaders to the municipal council and establish 
some Muslim friendly schools and access to municipal services. They discovered 
that the Serbs had constructed their own version of what had happened, the 
opposite of the findings by the ICTY and outsiders. According to the local Serbs, 
the first victims had been Serbs, every one was guilty, many of the alleged victims 
were still alive, the Muslims and Croats came of their own accord to the camps 
and the Serbs helped them to be evacuated, and so on. There had been no mention 
in any of the media about the ICTY trials and the convictions. A monument to 
the Serb victims of war was built. A Serbianization of culture and history had 
been accomplished with changes in street names, dates of holidays, Orthodox 
crosses, saints commemorated, and so on, all of which obliterated past events and 
responsibilities. Serbs argued that if so many non-Serbs came back, it proved that 
what had happened was not so bad after all.  
These findings highlight the power of the denial syndrome and collective 
myth making. The underlying mechanisms are ethnocentrism, conformity, 
cognitive dissonance, selective attention, selective perception, and 
ethnification, which are typical dimensions of social testing for knowledge 
and truth. Despite the success of war crimes trials in establishing truths that 
satisfy outsiders of the conflict, many participants commit to denial, collective 
myth-making and contradictory truths. A laissez-faire policy on shared truth 
gets defeated by the social dynamics within the adversary group. To overcome 
denial, what else besides tribunals has been done in the name of truth, justice 
and historical memory?   
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TRUTH COMMISSIONS
Truth and Reconciliation Commissions (TRC) (as used in South Africa and 
Guatemala), are also means for uncovering the truth and achieving partial justice 
after civil strife when there are thousands of  perpetrators and victims. The TRC 
achieved partial rather than full justice, because the political settlement by the 
adversaries included conditional amnesty for perpetrators of crimes – including 
for senior security personnel and politicians. In South Africa, amnesty was 
conditionally dependent on telling the truth and publicly apologizing to victims 
for politically motivated crimes at a public hearing. A great deal of knowledge 
about covered-up criminal events surfaced. These truths are difficult for public 
opinion to deny since they were voluntarily provided by perpetrators, accepted 
by the victims, testimonials were cross-checked with documentary evidence, and 
witnesses were subject to cross-examination. 
The Amnesty Committee of the South African TRC was empowered to 
determine whether the applicant’s actions met the criteria for amnesty in 
exchange for full disclosure. Failing that test, the case was to be referred to 
the justice system for prosecution. Both individuals and organization leaders 
appeared before it, including ex-Prime Minister De Klerk and ANC leaders 
Tembo and Mbeki. A total of 16,700 victims were identified by the Reparations 
and Rehabilitation Committee and received average compensation of about 
$500 – a sum which observers labeled “symbolic” because the legislature had 
limited the total reparation fund.  
By 2000, of 7,112 applications for amnesty, 849 were granted and 5,392 refused, 
with many referred to further prosecution. As can be seen from these figures, 
amnesty was not easy to obtain. Another committee, the Human Rights Violation 
Committee, investigated human rights abuses from 1960 to 1994. It established 
the identity of victims, the harm they suffered, the identity of offenders, and 
the complicity of both state and insurgency organizations. The committees 
held open hearings all over South Africa, in eleven languages, many broadcast 
on radio and television, which were a public forum for the victims to tell their 
story. Because of the work of these committees and large-scale participation of 
victims and offenders, the public learned about killings, torture, the human rights 
violations of the apartheid system and of inter-African political and criminal 
violence that could not be ignored. An “historical memory” was put on record by 
these authoritative commissions that will make fabrication and misinformation 
about the past difficult`. The South African public has by and large accepted the 
historical truth about its past (Oberschall 2007).
An actual case will illustrate how the TRC worked. Rayner Moringer, 
a foreign businessman in the aircraft industry had been living in South 
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Africa for thirty years before he became involved in the kidnapping (by 
the security police) of an African business acquaintance, Mr. Mbotoli, who 
was implicated in a coup attempt in the Transkei. At his trial for treason, 
Mbotoli had received a twenty year prison sentence. Moringer admitted 
helping in the abduction and that his actions were unlawful. He proved to 
the commissioners’ satisfaction that he had not profited financially through 
helping Military Intelligence. Called as a witness, Mbotoli stated that “in the 
spirit of Mandela and reconciliation, he advises the TRC to grant amnesty” 
to Moringer, and Moringer declared publicly “I am sorry and regret the harm 
to you”. The commission attorney pointed out that full disclosure was made, 
that the applicant was totally honest in his answers, and that his motive was 
political. In 1999 Moringer was granted amnesty.
Thousands of micro-level events and crimes were documented by the 
Amnesty Committee. The macro-conflict story was documented by the Human 
Rights Violation Committee and the operations of the state security agencies 
and their ties to the state apparatus and political leaders were revealed in great 
detail, as were the violent actions of insurgents and their ties to the ANC and 
other political bodies. Historians can and will piece these two types of sources 
together. No doubt differences in emphasis and interpretation will remain, as 
is true in professional history writing, but the TRC documentation process has 
set limits on historical truth. Beyond these limits are speculation, propaganda 
and fabrication, but no truth.
The truth commission process is strong on getting at truth. It has 
elements of the adversarial process, but it also enlists the cooperation of 
the perpetrator, victim and security agencies as in a scientific inquiry that 
mobilizes all resources for getting at truth. Amnesty is a powerful incentive 
for cooperation by those responsible for crimes. Unlike the International 
Tribunal process, the TRC has received favorable acceptance by both 
adversaries and bystander publics. Not every TRC type experience has 
been as successful as the South African one. In El Salvador, the UN-
mediated peace agreement on the twelve year civil war called for a UN truth 
commission to investigate and publicize human rights abuses, including 
killings by death squads. It proved politically impossible to punish top 
army generals and officers. There were no penalties for an estimated 
75,000 deaths, two-thirds of which were civilian. Some truth emerged, 
a little justice, but the peace held (Neier 1998). In Guatemala, a thirty 
year insurgency during which two hundred thousand people were killed 
ended with a UN mediated peace settlement in 1996. Both sides agreed 
to a general amnesty for war crimes, but not for crimes against humanity 
(i.e. against civilians). A Commission for Historical Clarification (CEH) 
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was set up to establish the truth about the war years. It submitted a 15 
volume report to the United Nations in 1999. Both the armed forces and 
the insurgents cooperated with the CEH to only a limited extent. It worked 
behind closed doors and its recommendations were non-binding. Because 
of these limitations, the Catholic Church created another truth commission 
called the Recovery of Historical Memory (REMHI). Church volunteers 
collected thousands of victim testimonies in open hearings using local 
Indian languages. Its investigators reconstructed 70 massacres, named 
55,000 killed civilians, and named war crimes perpetrators. When its four 
volume report was published, the head of the REMHI was murdered. A lot 
of historical and criminal truths were established, some justice was meted 
out, and the peace held (Kinzer 2001). South African delegations advocated 
truth and justice institutions for the Balkan states after the Dayton peace 
agreement, but were turned down. In some ways, the TRC model does 
not fit the Balkans well. The magnitude of the crimes in South Africa did 
not extend to the mass executions and large scale ethnic cleansing of the 
Balkans. Victims were abused and a few were tortured, but not killed. In 
the Balkans, the dead victims could not confront the perpetrators. South 
Africa is a unitary state with clear lines of authority for governance and 
justice, whereas a TRC in the Balkans would have to operate in a non-
cooperative multi-state environment. In South Africa, a mass movement 
of citizens, including both Africans and non-Africans, demanded truth, 
justice and an end to violence when government leaders and the African 
National Congress agreed to the National Peace Accord of 1991. In the 
Balkans, there was no popular mobilization by the adversaries for truth 
and justice.
COMMISSIONS OF INQUIRY BY OUTSIDERS
In most conflicts and wars, non-governmental advocates conduct inquiries 
and publish reports that have a factual component and recommendations to 
adversaries about stopping unlawful actions and taking remedial steps. The 
best known are Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, International 
Crisis Group, and others more specific to a particular conflict, like Iraqi Body 
Count and several on Darfur (United Nations Commission of Inquiry, United 
States Atrocities Documentation Team). Though these groups advocate for 
a cause, their reputation for objectivity and accuracy is their only asset for 
gaining visibility and funding and at least limited access to sources controlled 
by the adversaries. Though they tend to report more on knowledge and truth 
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than the propaganda put out by governments and partisan groups, they labor 
under greater handicaps than tribunals and TRCs. Still, they are a useful and 
at times the most reliable (or least unreliable) source of information about 
controversial conflict events. Other commissions of inquiry are conducted by 
international bodies like UN agencies. Because I do not have a good example 
from the Balkans, I will probe the strengths and weaknesses of outsider 
commissions with reference to the UN Fact Finding Mission on the Gaza 
Conflict (the Goldstone Report) to the Human Rights Council of the UN, 
released September 2, 2009.
The UN Mission’s mandate was to investigate violations of international 
human rights and international humanitarian law in the period June 2008 to July 
2009. The report does “not purport to be exhaustive in documenting the very 
high number of incidents” (para. 16) and selected 36 of them for scrutiny. It did 
not “pretend to reach standard of proof applicable in a criminal trial” (para. 25). 
Because the report is over five hundred pages long, I examine only a few important 
incidents about which I did some research before the report was released. A major 
problem for the Mission was that neither the Israeli government nor Hamas and 
the armed Palestinian fighter groups cooperated with it. In the Gaza population 
“those interviewed proved reluctant to speak about the presence and conduct of 
hostilities by Palestinian armed groups” (para. 439). The Gaza authorities, who the 
Mission believes are different from Hamas, were equally silent: ”we had nothing 
to do, directly or indirectly with the al-Qassim Brigades or other armed groups 
and had no knowledge of their tactics.” When the Mission requested meetings 
with armed groups, it was turned down (para. 441). Consequently the Mission 
had to rely on “indirect sources” such as NGOs, the media, the Israeli government 
reports, and private individuals. 
Few facts were uncovered that were not already known. The most publicized 
and controversial incident of the Gaza war was the shelling of al-Fakhura street 
by the Israeli army of an alleged Palestinian rocket launching team in which 
many were killed and wounded outside a UN school used as a civilian shelter. 
The Israelis claimed that the Palestinians purposely shielded the launch site 
through siting it near to civilians and that several fighters were also killed 
in the attack. The Mission found no new facts that were not discussed and 
debated at length in the international news media. The Canadian Globe and 
Mail published6 a comprehensive account of what really happened together 
with maps and photographs, which is more concise and clearer than the many 
pages devoted to the incident by the Mission report pp.146-156. The finding 
on the presence of Palestinian fighters and use of civilians as a shield was 
6 Patrick Martin, Canadian Globe and Mail, 29/1/2009. 
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inconclusive, as it was before the inquiry: “Mission notes that the attack 
may have been in response to a mortar attack from an armed Palestinian 
group…” (para. 690). In another incident, the air attack and destruction of 
the el Badr flour mill which took place after several Israeli warnings (para. 
920-921), the Mission accepted the Palestinian owner’s statement that the 
mill had not been used for any purpose by Palestinian armed groups. Yet it 
also reported that hundreds of shells were found on the roof, specifically spent 
40 mm. grenade machine-gun cartridges. The Mission undertook no follow 
up investigation: was this ammunition used by the IDF, by the Palestinians? 
Crucial information for the determination of war crimes and crimes against 
humanity was not collected on topics such as whether or not the IDF was 
shot at from the roof of the mill, and whether the mill was thus a legitimate 
military target. The mill incident was one of several which the Mission did 
not probe sufficiently to discover whether the IDF attack target attack was 
“dual use,” but yet concluded it was not and the IDF was at fault.
A contentious issue regarding violations of the laws of war was whether the 
Gaza police were a legitimate military target (the Israelis claimed that Hamas 
had integrated armed fighters and security forces into the police) or whether 
it was a distinct civilian police force, as the Palestinians claimed and as the 
Mission concluded. One sixth of all Palestinian deaths were police killed (248 
out of an estimated 1400 deaths), and thus counted as “civilians” killed in the 
war by the Palestinians, whereas the Israeli counted them as “combatants.” 
The Gaza authorities admitted that after Hamas seized power in June 2007, 
religious and resistance fighters were integrated into the police, but in a later 
reorganization the civil police were differentiated from the security police 
(which played a military role). According to the Gaza authorities, the police 
were responsible for crime fighting and combating drug trafficking. They were 
equipped with Kalashnikov firearms (a military weapon) because the police 
“have not been able to obtain other equipment such as small guns” (para. 
410). Estimates of Hamas members in police units by police commanders 
ranged from 70-95%. At the start of the war, the police received orders to 
continue law enforcement, supervise humanitarian aid distribution, “protect 
the internal front” (round up Fatah supporters, see ‘internal violence’ chapter), 
and “face the enemy if Gaza is invaded.” The Gaza authorities claimed that 
not a single policeman had been killed in combat. None of these claims were 
investigated by the Mission (para. 393-428). It investigated the circumstances 
of death for 99 policemen killed in police stations and training grounds in the 
first Israeli airstrikes. But for other police deaths, there was no mention of any 
investigation. Did the police oversee humanitarian aid distribution? Did they 
safe-keep abandoned buildings? Did they go into hiding? Did they fight the 
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IDF? Did they arrest Palestinian fighters who were launching rockets in the 
vicinity of civilians? The Mission made no attempt to find out. It might also 
have checked the death certificates and circumstances of the 149 policemen 
“not killed in combat”. An Israeli research group identified the names of 
78 dead policemen on the websites of al-Qassam brigades and other armed 
groups. The Mission acknowledged (para. 423) that “these cases require in-
depth investigation”, but it did not do it: “the Mission could not verify the 
allegations of membership of armed groups of policemen” (para. 428). Its 
finding on the police was that “there is insufficient information to conclude 
that Gaza police as a whole has been incorporated into the armed forces of 
the Gaza authorities” (para. 427). Because they were not proven combatants, 
the Mission concluded that the IDF was at fault for not providing the same 
protection to Gaza police as civilians are afforded in war. 
The Mission also investigated the blockade and its effects on the people and 
economy of Gaza. It noted that (para. 317) “The number of trucks is considered 
a fair measure of the amount of imports and exports from the Gaza Strip. This 
number increased slightly (my emphasis) during the period of calm between 
June and November 2008, but declined sharply again in November due to a 
resumption of hostilities following the Israeli incursion”. The UN Office for 
the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) publishes the Incoming 
Gaza Truckload by Commodity category on a monthly basis.7 For food, animal 
feed, and medical supplies, roughly the same number of truckloads entered 
Gaza during the entire period of the blockade, in keeping with Israeli policy 
on humanitarian aid. The blocked commodities were in other categories. On 
June 2008, an agreement was worked out between the Israelis and Hamas: 
Hamas would stop firing rockets and mortars at Israel, and Israel would lift 
the blockade. Hamas had launched 357 projectiles in May and 245 in June, 
which decreased to 9 in July, 11 in August, 4  in September and 2 in October.8 
How did Israel respond?  
According to OCHA, truckloads of construction material went up in number 
from 17 and 2 in May/June to 2256 and 903 in July/August; industrial goods 
from 15 and 16 to 16 and 117; non-edible consumables from 14 and 16.5 to 
106.5 and 156.5; livestock from 21 and 19 to 62 and 152; agricultural raw 
materials from 16.5 and 25.5 to 66 and 57. These changes the Mission report 
described as “slightly increased.” What brought an end to the truce? Hamas 
resumed firing rockets and mortars in November and December: after firing 2 
7 OCHA, Occupied Palestinian Territories, Gaza Crossing.
8  Summary of Rocket Fire and Mortar Shelling in 2008, Intelligence and Terrorism Information 
Centre.
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in October, they fired 193 in November and 602 in December. In retaliation, 
Israel decreased the amount of truckloads of food, animal fodder and medical 
supplies allowed to cross for two months, then increased them again, but shut 
down the sending of other commodities. In this instance the UN Fact Finding 
Mission was remiss in not providing facts, which could have been found from 
data and tables publicly available through UN sources. 
In conclusion, based on the incidents analyzed in the Goldstone report 
which I also researched, and not withstanding parts of the inquiry which were 
professionally conducted, the Mission did not meet the standards expected 
of an adversarial or scientific inquiry into historical truth. It did not meet the 
standards set by ICTY and the TRC.  In a highly politicized international climate 
flaws and biases associated with social testing impinged on its methodology 
and interpretations. Because the adversaries refused to cooperate, the Mission 
was deprived of the most salient sources of information to get at historic truth. 
Despite these limitations, it could have performed better, as I have tried to 
point out for a few instances. 
Accusations were made about pro-Palestinian bias, but the problem with 
such an inquiry has deeper roots. It ignores the last twenty-five years’ of 
research and knowledge about new wars, asymmetric warfare, insurgency, 
urban guerrilla warfare and counter-terrorism (Alt – Richardson 2007). The 
frame it employs for its methodology and interpretations is a state against 
state model, where peace and war are distinct; combatant and civilian are 
sharply distinguished; the fog of war is limited; collateral damage, dual 
use, proportionality of response and other warfare norms in the Geneva 
Conventions are clear-cut; officials who are interviewed tell the truth; no one 
fabricates false evidence by tampering with videos; witnesses don’t lie and 
there is a paper or electronic trail for verifying and cross-checking, and so on. 
That is not the real world of the Gaza war and other contemporary conflicts 
(Oberschall 2008). One fighter in Gaza city was interviewed by a news 
reporter: he took up the accusation that Hamas fighters hid behind civilians. 
Fighters in a way are both, he argued, and are accepted by many residents as 
defenders. People bring them food, he said. Sometimes they oppose rockets 
being launched nearby, but often they do not. “I am a civilian, and I am a 
fighter” he said.9 That is the real Gaza war.
In the Gaza war, the news media produced a huge amount of data on the 
war. Some of it was on the central issue of Hamas using civilians as a cover 
for launching rockets. One eyewitness in Gaza said…“they (Hamas) fired 
rockets in between houses and covered the alleys with sheets so they could set 
9 New York Times, 14/1/2009.
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the rockets up in five minutes without the planes seeing them. The moment 
they fired them, they escaped…”.10 Another twenty-one year old member of 
Islamic Jihad who had received a shrapnel wound said “we are fighting the 
Israelis. When we fire we run, but they hit back so fast we run into houses to 
get away”.11 A surgeon reported that “Hamas militants next to his apartment 
building fired mortar and rocket rounds. Israel fired back with force and his 
apartment was hit. His wife and his five-year old son were killed”.12 There 
was no reluctance on the part of the Gaza residents and the fighters to speak 
to the news media during the war. But the Goldstone Commission discounted 
such information and relied instead of statements to the Mission by officials 
who had every reason to tell untruths and reluctant witnesses who knew the 
danger of telling the truth about Hamas fighters. The report concluded (para. 
35) that it found evidence that Palestinian armed groups had launched rockets 
from urban areas. That is hardly an issue, since most of Gaza is an urban area. 
The issue is whether the rockets were launched in the vicinity of and close 
to inhabited places so that these actions recklessly endangered civilians and 
were in violation of the laws of war. 
Justice Goldstone stated that “I accepted with hesitation my United Nations 
mandate to investigate alleged violations of the laws of war and international 
human rights during Israel’s three week war in Gaza…I accepted because the 
mission was to look at all parties…both Israel and Hamas have dismal records 
of investigating their own forces. Absent credible local investigations, the 
international community has a role to play…” (NYT 27/9/2009). I do not 
doubt Justice Goldstone’s good intentions and integrity, but the Mission 
performance for getting at historical truth was unsatisfactory.
UNDOING COLLECTIVE MYTHS: 
GERMANY AND FRANCE
Germany and France have fought several wars against one another since 
the wars of the French Revolution, resulting in millions of dead, many 
war crimes and atrocities, massive propaganda dehumanizing the enemy, a 
punitive and humiliating peace settlement at Versailles, territorial losses and 
gains, and much else that fueled revenge and Nazi nationalism. After the war, 
10 New York Times, 19/1/2009.
11 New York Times, 10/1/2010.
12 New York Times, 1/1/2009.
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the Nurnberg war crimes trials meted out justice for the top Nazi leadership. 
Mountains of evidence were made public and the Nazi and German war 
crimes could no longer be denied. President De Gaulle and Chancellor 
Adenauer did not stop there. They sponsored a broad range of Franco-
German collaborations by professional associations and civic bodies designed 
to change their historical adversarial relationship. Universities established 
relations under the auspices of a conference of rectors; twin-city partnerships 
were established starting in 1949; a Franco-German commission of secondary 
school teachers made changes in the history and geography curricula and 
textbooks; secondary school partnerships were started for pupil exchanges; 
Franco-German intellectual associations were created under the leadership 
of highly regarded public intellectuals like Alfred Gosser and Theodor Heuss 
and the entire reconciliation enterprise was capped by the state visit of De 
Gaulle to West Germany in 1962 and the Franco-German treaty a year later 
(Oberschall 2007: 216-217). Franco-German cooperation started the building 
of the road to the formation of the European Union. 
An important part of conciliation was teaching future generations a 
truthful version of Franco-German history instead of the blatantly nationalist 
histories and popular culture that the previous generations had been exposed 
to. It was not an easy task. Every town and city in both countries had its 
monument to the war dead in the central square. Military cemeteries were 
located at the battlefield. Street names, national holidays, literature, movies, 
cultural stereotypes and personal memories kept a nationalist history current. 
Nevertheless, with a great deal of work, these deadly and destructive events 
were framed as a tragic consequence of nation state rivalries and total war 
which must come to an end once and for all if Europe is to be peaceful
Truth, justice, reconciliation and memory (TJCM) are on a tortuous path in 
the Northern Ireland peace process. The Northern Ireland Peace Agreement 
of 1998 created a power sharing government but left many contentious issues 
for commissions to consider at a later date, including the decommissioning 
of IRA weapons, police reform, and truth and justice for the 3500 insurgency 
related deaths from 1969 to 1998 (about one thousand deaths to the army and 
police, and the remaining to paramilitaries and civilians). The Republicans 
(Sinn Fein) refused to sign the agreement unless there was a prisoner release 
of those charged with terrorism related offenses. During the troubles, one 
of the principal arenas of confrontation between the Republicans and the 
British government was over the demand, through mass hunger strikes, of 
prisoner of war status for paramilitary detainees. They had been convicted 
in special courts for the most part on weapons charges and membership in a 
banned (terrorist) organization. Most were released within two years of the 
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Agreement. There was no amnesty, and there were three thousand deaths to 
account for. The government created a blue ribbon Consultative Group on the 
Past (CGP) to come up with a TJCM plan.
In January 2009, the CGP reported its recommendations to the government 
and the public (NYT 29/1/2009). The executive summary stated “Northern 
Ireland has made tremendous progress …toward peace and stable government 
...the divisions of the past that led to the conflict in the first place are all too 
present and only by honestly addressing the past can we truly deal with it 
and then leave it to the past” The heart of it was a Legacy Commission and a 
Reconciliation Forum that would coordinate with the Commission for Victims 
and Survivors. The plan resembled the South African Truth and Reconciliation 
process, but was promptly denounced for suggesting a recognition payment 
of twelve thousand pounds to victims’ families, regardless of circumstances 
and guilt (which the media labeled a ‘compensation’ payment, implying that 
human life was considered worth twelve thousand pounds by the CGP). The 
Unionists were outraged about the implied moral equivalence of a policeman 
killed in the line of duty and a terrorist killed in an attack. Sinn Fein leader 
Gerry Adams did not think that a British Legacy Commission would uncover 
the truth due to “state secrecy and concealment” and called for an international 
commission. The heads of the CGP stated that if the proposal was ignored, 
there could be thirty years of public inquiries, disrupting reconciliation. 
Despite these controversies, the vast majority of the people of Northern 
Ireland are committed to the peace process; the exception is a small group of 
violent spoilers calling themselves the REAL IRA. Steps have been taken in 
Northern Ireland to remake historical memory and popular culture. Although 
over 90% of Protestant children attend de facto Protestant schools and 90% 
of Catholic pupils attend Catholic schools, curriculum, textbook and teacher 
training changes have been made to reduce sectarian bias in history and social 
studies and to promote toleration. In the past and during the Troubles, the 
most bloody sectarian riots took place at Orange marches (or parades) that 
commemorate the seventeenth century English military victories over the 
Irish and the history of domination of Protestants over Catholics. 
The marching season peaks at the July 12 parades commemorating the 1690 
Battle of the Boyne and the victorious William of Orange. It is a national 
holiday. Scots cross the Irish Sea by the thousands to support their Northern 
Ireland “kith and kin”. The night before, Protestant youth light bonfires in 
all-night celebrations. On the twelfth, members of the Orange Order, dressed 
in dark suits and wearing bowler hats and orange sashes, march in the main 
street of towns and cities, and alternate with fife and drum bands (known as 
“kick the pope” bands) whose performers sing provocative songs and chant 
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insulting slogans, amid a sea of flags hung from balconies and lamp posts. The 
riots occur when the marchers proceed through Nationalist neighborhoods 
where the residents pelt them and the police with bricks, fire bombs and gun 
shots. During the troubles, some marches were rerouted and banned altogether 
because they occasioned civil strife, the last time on June 24, 2005 in North 
Belfast. Since the Good Friday peace agreement, attempts have been made to 
tone down the political dimension of the marches and the violent history they 
commemorate and reframe the twelfth as a family-friendly cultural event, 
an “Orangefest” at which tourists are welcome. A leading businessman in 
Derry explained to me how such sectarian marches were bad for business 
and tourism, and how a Derry businessman’s association was working with 
the local Orange lodges, the police, and Nationalist leaders to “tame” these 
events. It had been successful in Derry. 
The Orange marches story bears some similarity to the early Christians 
making Christian holidays out of pagan festivals and transforming pagan 
temples into churches. No one denies the bloody Anglo-Irish history, and the 
full story of the Troubles’ victims will become public. Reframing the Orange 
marches updates that divisive history with the emerging reality of  sharing 
governance, a reformed and integrated police force, and non-discriminatory 
employment in government and increasingly also the private sector. Symbols 
and collective celebrations convey the new reality as well as the old, and what 
better way of doing that than invest new meaning into a centuries old popular 
tradition.
When truth and justice are avoided in the aftermath of bloody conflicts, for 
the sake of nation building, political leaders can exploit doubts and passions 
about the past in order to turn peoples against one another.  In the much 
quoted essay “What is a Nation?” the French historian Renan wrote that “…
the essence of a nation is that all individuals have many things in common, 
and also that they have forgotten many things…Forgetting, I would go so far 
as to say historical error, is a crucial factor in the creation of a nation” (Eley 
– Suny 1996). Tito’s Yugoslavia instituted a culture of “brotherhood and 
unity” between  peoples through all the organs of the League of Communists, 
enforced a policy of forgetting about atrocities perpetrated in World War II 
and prosecuted those who lifted the veil of silence. Neither the communists 
nor the nationalists were interested in historical truth.  Each group harbored 
its own agenda and version of the truth. After Tito’s death, nationalists started 
a politics of fear and historical falsehoods that mobilized the peoples of 
Yugoslavia against one another. 
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CONCLUSION
I have examined four institutions designed to get at the knowledge and truth 
about contested historical events and their interpretation: the international 
criminal tribunal, the truth and reconciliation commission, the outsider 
commission, and political agreement between adversaries. I have shown 
that the tribunal process converges on truth and can and has discovered truth 
successfully for contested current events and recent history, but acceptance by 
adversaries is problematic. In the tribunal, the same rules apply to adversaries; 
all evidence is accessed by both parties, witnesses are cross examined under 
oath, documents are verified for authenticity and completeness, experts 
provide technical and scientific evaluations, an impartial jury or judges 
determine truth beyond reasonable doubt (but not all doubt), and  there is 
an opportunity for appeal. Truth commissions perform well under favorable 
political conditions when all adversaries consent, and acceptance by all 
sides is broader than for tribunals. Commissions by outsiders are sometimes 
the only available alternative to self-serving propaganda by adversaries. 
Unfortunately, they can become politicized and fail to achieve an accepted 
standard for historical truth. 
Professional historians’ “skepticism” frame enables them to reach historical 
truth better than politicized commissions, though it is true that some historians 
choose to remain or become partisans. Professional historians can distinguish 
historical fiction (The Three Musketeers); fictionalized history (the author 
invents speeches and thoughts by Napoleon, Cesar, Ronald Reagan to make 
the case for his interpretation); fabrication of history (the Protocols of the 
elders of Zion); history as glorious myth  and propaganda (e.g. the nation is 
chosen by God, history, destiny etc. for a grand mission); and history writing 
that conforms to the norms of the justice and tribunal process and converges 
on truth. Much of the public also makes such distinctions. Similarly, for 
contested current events, an ICTY tribunal process, commissions of inquiry, 
a TRC process, civic and professional groups committed to truthfulness, and 
professional journalism challenge propaganda, misinformation, myth making 
and self serving spin in the “court of public opinion,” but there is no final 
arbiter for truth and falsehood, no judges or jury whose decision is binding, 
and no convergence on truth. True and false facts, accounts and explanations 
are available for the picking. Ordinary people select what they want to hear 
and what they already agree with, what is accepted in their social milieu, and 
what presents their group in a favorable light. Unless political leaders and 
authorities who were former adversaries join in a massive effort to get at the 
truth, be it though the political process – as in Germany and France after World 
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War II – or with a TRC process – as in South Africa –, divergent collective 
memories and myths will persist, available for mobilization by adversaries. I 
do not believe that benign neglect of the truth is the answer, or that time will 
heal old wounds once and for all, for some subsequent generations. 
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